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Abstract 
People fixate on blank locations if relevant visual stimuli 
previously occupied that location; the so-called ‘looking-at-
nothing’ effect. While several theories have been proposed to 
explain potential reasons for the phenomenon, no theory has 
attempted to predict the stability of this effect with practice. 
We conducted an experiment in which participants listened to 
four different sentences. Each sentence was associated with 
one of four areas on the screen and was presented 12 times. 
After every presentation participants heard a statement 
probing one sentence, while the computer screen was blank. 
More fixations were found to be located in areas associated 
with the probed sentence than in other locations. Moreover, 
the more trials participants had completed, the less frequently 
they exhibited looking-at-nothing behavior. Fixations on 
blank locations seem to occur when an attempt is made to 
retrieve information associated with a spatial location as long 
as it is not strongly represented in memory. 
Keywords: Eye tracking, practice, spatial cognition, mental 
representation, working memory 
Introduction 
When processing information from the visual world, human 
cognition integrates visual and auditory input with abstract, 
higher level mental representations (Huettig, Olivers, & 
Hartsuiker, 2010). Reactivation of such a memory 
representation leads the gaze back to spatial locations or 
areas that were previously occupied by relevant information. 
For example, when we mention something about a table 
presented on a whiteboard, we might point towards the 
whiteboard, even if the table is no longer there anymore.  
Richardson and Spivey (2000) were among the first to 
show a close link between eye movements, auditory 
information processing and semantic information 
processing, in an information-retrieval task. Participants 
were presented with a spinning cross in one of four equal-
sized areas on a computer screen together with spoken 
factual information. After four facts were presented, 
participants heard a statement probing one of the presented 
facts and had to judge the truth of the statement. During this 
retrieval phase the computer screen was blank. Participants 
fixated more in the critical area where the sought-after 
information was presented compared to other areas on the 
screen. 
This so-called ‘looking-at-nothing’ behavior (Ferreira, 
Apel, & Henderson, 2008) also occurs when the probed 
information is presented visually (Laeng & Teodorescu, 
2001; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2010; Spivey & Geng, 2001), 
when information is anticipated (Altmann & Kamide, 2007), 
in light and in complete darkness (Johansson, Holsanova & 
Holmqvist, 2006), and for simple (Brand & Stark, 1997) and 
more complex pictures (Johansson, Holsanova, & 
Holmqvist, 2010). 
Ferreira et al. (2008) assumes a memory representation of 
an object or event that integrates visual, auditory and spatial 
information and leads to a corresponding visual, linguistic, 
spatial, and conceptual representation. When one part of this 
integrated memory representation is reactivated, other parts 
are retrieved, as well. This in turn causes gazing behavior 
toward the location where the information was previously 
presented. For example, seeing a table on a whiteboard leads 
to the activation of a visual as well as conceptual 
representation of the figure. Additionally, spoken language 
leads to the formation of a linguistic representation. The 
visual world leads to the activation of a spatial index 
(Pylyshyn, 2001), which can be used later to direct our gaze 
back to the area on a whiteboard, where the figure was 
previously presented.  
Huettig et al. (2010) recently proposed a general 
framework to describe how linguistic and visual 
representations are bound together in an integrated memory 
representation. Their model, like that of Ferreira et al. 
(2008), assumes the integration of information in a 
connected visual, linguistic, spatial, and conceptual 
representation. It further includes ideas proposed by 
Altmann and Kamide (2007), Knoeferle and Krocker 
(2007), and Spivey (2007). Here, we briefly introduce their 
framework. It is worthwhile to note that they include a 
detailed description of how integrated memory 
representations can be linked to existing theories of long-
term and working memory (c.f., Baddeley, 2000). Huettig et 
al. (2010) propose that language–vision interactions are 
based on long-term memory, where conceptual 
representations (e.g., the concept of a figure or of a 
whiteboard) are derived from. Therefore, long-term memory 
serves as a stable knowledge base. It is then working 
memory that grounds cognition in space and time and leads 
to the formation of short-term connections between objects 
(e.g., spoken language, a figure, and a whiteboard). 
Contents of working memory are linked to contents of long-
term memory via spatial indices. Because of this association 
working memory can instantiate a gaze back to the object. 
In describing connections between memory representations, 
Heuttig et al. (2010) assume that the stronger the association 
between the linguistic and conceptual representations the 
higher “the probability of triggering a saccadic eye-
movement” (p. 5). 
Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, and Hoover (2009) share 
Huettig at al.’s (2010) general idea of an integrated memory 
representation. In contrast, however, they suggest that only 
sparse internal representations are built during the encoding 
of information. They assume that during information 
retrieval, an eye movement can be launched to the 
associated area in order to gather more information. This 
occurs when the spatial pointer (i.e., the visual part of the 
integrated memory representation) does not include the 
searched information: “If the pointer’s tag does not include 
the attribute, then the pointer’s address to the external 
environment is the next obvious resource” (Spivey, 2007, p. 
298). The link between information sampling from the 
environment and eye movements can be understood as the 
covert orienting of visual–spatial attention (Hoffman, & 
Subramaniam, 1995). Targeting a position makes it 
necessary to allocate attention towards that place. Because it 
is impossible to make an eye movement without an 
attentional movement (Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 
1986), attending to information stored in an integrated 
memory representation leads to eye movements towards 
associated spatial areas. 
Summarizing, we conclude that during the encoding of 
information an integrated memory representation is formed 
from different modalities. However, theories diverge in 
terms of how much information is included in the memory 
representation and how this in turn affects the looking-at-
nothing behavior. Ferreira et al. (2008) assume that the 
probability of triggering an eye movement increases with 
the strength of the association between the linguistic and 
conceptual representation. Consequently, one could predict 
that looking-at-nothing behavior becomes stronger with an 
increasing association between these representations. Spivey 
(2007), on the other hand, proposes that looking at nothing 
mainly occurs for the purposes of gathering information not 
yet included in the mental representation. In line with this 
one might conclude that looking at nothing diminishes as 
relevant information is included in the memory 
representation.  
To test these assumptions we varied the degree to which 
information is included in memory representation. More 
precisely, we manipulated the degree of practice in a task, 
where auditory information, which is associated with 
contents from a visual scene, has to be retrieved from 
memory. With more practice, the strength with which 
retrieval-relevant information is represented in memory 
increases (e.g., Anderson & Schooler, 1991). If looking at 
nothing increases with practice, then Huettig et al.’s 
assumptions would be supported. On the other hand, if 
looking at nothing decreases with practice, our findings 
would support Spivey (2007) and conclude that looking at 
nothing varies with the degree of relevant information 
included in the mental representation. 
Experiment 
To test looking-at-nothing behavior under different levels of 
practice we conducted an experiment in which participants 
were presented with four different sentences. Each sentence 
described an artificial scene. The same set of four sentences 
was presented in each of 12 experimental trials. After every 
presentation trial a retrieval phase followed in which one of 
the four sentences was probed. In every trial each sentence 
was associated with the same spatial location on a computer 
screen.  
Method 
Participants. Eighteen students (14 female; age M = 22.8) 
from Chemnitz University of Technology participated in the 
experiment. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision with contact lenses. All participants were native 
German speakers. 
 
Apparatus and material. Participants were seated in front 
of a computer screen at a distance of 630 mm and instructed 
to position their head in a chin rest. The eye-tracker system 
SMI iView REDpt was used to sample data of the right eye 
at 50Hz with a precision of 0.05°. Data were recorded with 
iView X 1.7 and analyzed with BeGaze 2.3 and MatLab 
7.0.1 software programs. Stimuli in the experiment were 
presented using E-Prime 2.0 on a 380-mm × 305-mm 
computer screen with a resolution of 800 × 600 pixels. 
The visual stimuli consisted of a grid dividing the screen 
into four equal-sized areas with a fixation cross at the center 
of the grid. Each set of four sentences was associated with 
the same symbol – a black circle with a white loudspeaker 
in it – which appeared in one of the four areas of the grid 
depending on the sentence that was presented. 
The auditory stimuli presented in the presentation trial 
consisted of four prerecorded sentences each describing 
three attributes of an artificial scene (e.g., “There is a place 
with a purple lighthouse, a sickle bay, and a wooden 
church.”). To test gaze behavior in the retrieval phase, we 
generated 24 statements: A true and a false version for each 
of the four statements multiplied by three attributes (The 
false statement probing the example sentence from above 
was “There is a place with a wooden cottage.”). Figure 1 
shows 1 of the 12 experimental trials. 
 
Procedure. To mask study intentions, students were told 
they were participating in a study concerning pupil dilation 
that involved solving a memory task. No instructions 
concerning gaze behavior were provided. The eye tracker 
was calibrated using a 9-point calibration method. This 
procedure lasted between 5 and 10 min. Subsequently, the 
12 experimental trials started. In each of the 12 trials, the 
same four sentences were presented in random order. Every 
sentence always appeared with the symbol in the same area 
on the screen with a presentation duration of 30 s. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example trial with the four experimental 
sentences (presentation phase) and a statement probing the 
first sentence (retrieval phase). Original material in German. 
 
After presentation of the fourth sentence within a trial, the 
retrieval phase followed. Participants heard a statement, 
which referred to a fact from one of the four sentences, and 
judged it to be true or false. To observe participants’ gaze 
behavior, they were intentionally not instructed to reply as 
soon as possible. Presentation of one statement lasted 4 s. 
Statements were randomly assigned to trials and participants 
with the restriction that every statement was probed once for 
each participant. Participants had to answer the true or the 
false version of a statement balanced across trials and 
participants such that every participant was presented with 
six true and six false statements. A true statement was 
recorded when participants responded verbally with ‘right’ 
and a false statement with ‘wrong’. Immediately following 
this response, the investigator pressed a key signaling the 
start of the next trial. In this way, participants were not 
required to look at the keyboard (This procedure was chosen 
to prevent gazing away from the monitor towards the 
keyboard, which could have led to loss in quality of eye-
tracking data). After depressing the key, the investigator 
noted the particpant’s response on a sheet of paper. During 
the 12 experimental trials and their retrieval phases, gaze 
data were recorded. Afterwards, participants filled out a 
questionnaire which interrogated demographic variables and 
the assumed goal of the study. Before leaving, participants 
were informed about the true nature of the study. 
 
Analysis. To assess participants’ performance, we collected 
data on the accuracy of their responses and response times 
(i.e., the time beginning with the retrieval phase and ending 
with a participant’s reply as noted by the investigator). As 
reaction times are prone to error through outliers (e.g., when 
an investigator does not stop recording immediately upon a 
participant’s response) we did not exclude outliers but used 
median reaction times for further analysis. 
To assess looking at nothing, gaze data from the 
beginning of the retrieval phase to a participant’s reply (i.e., 
analogous to response time) was analyzed. Four adjacent 
‘areas of interest’ (AOIs) were defined corresponding to the 
four areas on the screen. Numbers of fixations in every AOI 
were counted per person and per trial. A fixation was 
defined as having a minimum duration of 100 ms and a 
maximum dispersion of 100 pixels (1.3° visual angle). The 
AOI associated with a probed sentence is called the ‘critical 
area’. Gaze behavior was analyzed, whereby trials were 
discarded in which tracking data was missing for >40% of 
the trial duration (8% of all trials). Missing tracking data 
was caused by blinks, lost pupil or corneal reflectance, or 
looking away from the screen. 
To test the independent variable practice, we aggregated 
the number of fixations in the AOIs as well as the 
performance data over sets of four experimental trials. This 
allowed us to compare three conditions of practice: block 1 
(consisting of trials 1–4), block 2 (trials 5–8), and block 3 
(trials 9–12). 
Number of fixations and median reaction times were only 
analyzed for trials that were answered correctly. 
Results 
Performance measures. Overall, mean percentage of 
correct responses to the statements was M = 87.8% (SD = 
20.8%), suggesting that the material was neither too difficult 
to memorize nor too easy to learn. A one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect for accuracy 
over the three blocks, F(2,34) = 11.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed an increase in 
performance from the first to the second block, Mb1 = 73% 
vs. Mb2 = 93%, p = .004, and from the first to the third 
block, Mb1 = 73% vs. Mb3=97%, p =.005. There was no 
significant change in performance from the second to the 
third block, Mb2 = 93% vs. Mb3 = 97%, p = 1.00. 
The median reaction time to the statement in the retrieval 
phase was 6206 ms (SD = 1617 ms). Over the three blocks 
of practice participants became faster in correctly 
responding, Greenhouse–Geisser-corrected F(1,48;34) = 
9.61, p = .002, ηp2 = .36.  
Bonferroni post-hoc tests confirm a decrease in the 
median reaction times from the first to the second block Mb1 
= 7211 ms vs. Mb2 = 5798 ms, p = .016 and from the first to 
the third block, Mb1 = 7211 ms vs. Mb3=5608 ms, p = .009. 
Again, there is no difference between the second and the 
third block, Mb2 = 5798 ms vs. Mb3 = 5608 ms, p = 1.00. 
Response accuracy and median reaction times showed that 
the practice manipulation was successful. With more 
practice, participants answered correctly more often and 
replied more quickly to the statements. 
 
 
Mean number of fixations.  
Exemplary gaze behavior of a typical participant. Figure 2 
shows scan paths of a typical participant for the presentation 
and the retrieval phase of three trials, where the critical area 
was on the bottom right. Lines show saccades and circles 
represent fixations with bigger circles indicating longer 
fixations. Scan paths on the top left and right side of Figure 
2 show a trial from block 1. In this trial, the sentence that 
was associated with the symbol in the bottom right area of 
the screen was probed for the first time.  
 
Presentation phase  Retrieval phase 
Block 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Block 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Block 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scan paths of one participant for a trial in block 1 
(top), a trial in block 2 (middle) and a trial in block 3 
(bottom) with the critical area at the bottom right.  
Left: presentation phase (scan paths of four sentence 
presentations)1, right: retrieval phase. 
 
Scan paths on the left and right side in the middle of Figure 
2 show a trial from block 2. In this trial, the sentence on the 
bottom right was probed for the second time. Scan paths on 
the left and right side on the bottom of Figure 2 show gaze 
behavior when the sentence was probed for the third time 
(block 3). Comparing scan paths from top to bottom on the 
left side of Figure 2, scan paths reveal that throughout the 
experiment the participant kept on following the symbols 
during the presentation phase. In comparison, gaze behavior 
in the retrieval phase (Figure 2, right) seems to change over 
                                                           
1
 Longer fixations at the bottom right area are only shown by 
displayed data and not systematically. To control for gaze biases 
the critical area was randomized across trials.  
the experiment. In block 1, the participant directs several 
gazes to the critical area (Figure 2, top right). With 
increasing practice, fewer fixations in the critical area are 
made (middle and bottom right). 
 
Aggregated gaze behavior. Figure 3 shows the proportion of 
fixations in the critical area during the retrieval phase. 
Proportions were aggregated for each block and across 
participants. Participants showing looking-at-nothing 
behavior should fixate in the critical area during the retrieval 
phase. To test this, for each block, we compared the 
proportion of fixations in the critical area with a chance 
level of 25%. In block 1, the proportion of fixations in the 
critical area (37.2 %) is indeed above chance, tb1(17) = 2.09, 
p = .051, g = .99. In blocks 2 and 3 the proportion of 
fixations in the critical area were at chance levels, mean 
proportion block 2: 17.9 %, tb2(17) = –1.73, p = .102, g = 
.82; mean proportion block 3: 28.5 %, tb3(17) = 0.81, p = 
.426, g = .38. These results suggest that looking at nothing 
diminished from block 1 to block 2 and that the proportion 
of fixations did not vary meaningfully from chance in block 
3. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of fixations in the critical area across 
blocks. Error bars represent standard error, dotted line 
indicates chance level.  
Discussion 
Theories on the link between eye movements and auditory 
and semantic information processing (Huettig et al., 2010) 
assume that during the encoding of information an 
integrated memory representation is formed from different 
modalities. However, these theories do not agree on how 
much information is included in the memory representation. 
Using the looking-at-nothing paradigm, we tried to shed 
some light on this question. 
Assuming an integrated memory representation as 
proposed by Ferreira et al. (2008), the probability of 
triggering an eye movement during retrieval of information 
from memory will increase with the strength of the 
association between the different parts of the representation. 
Spivey (2007), on the other hand, proposed that only sparse 
internal representations are built during the encoding of 
information. Consequently, eye movements during memory 
retrieval occur mainly to gather information that is not yet 
included in the mental representation. According to Ferreira 
et al. (2008), looking at nothing should increase with 
practice, while for Spivey (2007) the same behavior should 
diminish with practice.  
Practice was induced by presenting participants with a set 
of four sentences, 12 times. Each presentation phase was 
followed by a retrieval phase where one sentence was 
probed. To test whether the manipulation was successful, 
we first checked if participants showed increasing 
performance in the retrieval task. Results show that over the 
three blocks, participants indeed replied with increasing 
accuracy and speed to the facts probing the presented 
sentences. Accuracy as well as response times revealed that 
the performance increase was stronger from the first to the 
second block, than from the second to the third block. It 
seems that over the three blocks of practice memory 
associations for the sentences were strengthened leading to 
more correct and faster responses. Therefore, we conclude 
that the practice manipulation was successful.  
The question we wished to answer was how looking-at-
nothing behavior would be affected by the content of the 
memory representation. In block 1, participants looked more 
often to the critical area on the screen than a chance level of 
25% would predict. In blocks 2 and 3 looking at nothing 
diminished. In both blocks, fixations in the critical area did 
not amount to more than that predicted by a chance level of 
25%.  
Results of the first block replicated results of Richardson 
and Spivey (2000), which showed a close relationship 
between gaze behavior and language processing. In block 1, 
information was not strongly represented in memory. Eye 
movements were launched to the critical area on the screen 
in order to collect information from the visual scene. For 
blocks 2 and 3 we assumed that the looking-at-nothing 
behavior would become stronger or diminish, respectively. 
Our results were not in line with the predictions of Huettig 
et al. (2010), which stated that looking at nothing becomes 
stronger as the association in memory is strengthened. 
While performance improved over the three blocks, looking 
at nothing did not increase in strength. Our results seem to 
support the assumption of Spivey (2007) that looking-at-
nothing behavior is executed to gather more information 
from the environment. In blocks 2 and 3, the memory 
representation might have included all relevant information. 
Thus, addressing an eye movement to the critical area on the 
screen became ‘unnecessary’.  
We found that looking at nothing varies with the content 
of the memory representation. This supports the work of 
Richardson et al. (2009), who assume the existence of an 
internal memory story, whereby all relevant information is 
stored in an integrated memory representation, and an 
external memory store (O’ Regan, 1992), which assumes 
only sparse memory representations and uses a spatial index 
to address the visual world. Moreover, these are not 
mutually exclusive abilities of the cognitive system. Instead, 
the cognitive system can use both. The question is, when do 
we rely on an internal memory representation and when on 
an external memory store? Hoover and Richardson (2008) 
and Johansson et al. (2010) suggest that looking at nothing 
helps to relieve working memory when information is 
retrieved from memory. For example, Johansson et al. 
(2010) presented participants with an auditory description of 
a complex scene while participants had to fixate the center 
of a whiteboard. In a second condition they saw the picture 
of a complex scene but again had to fixate on the center of 
the picture’s scene. In both conditions, when they had to 
retell the information they had heard, and when they had to 
describe the visual scene, they drew the scene with their 
eyes on the whiteboard and did not maintain a central 
fixation. In contrast, in a study reported by Brand and Stark 
(1997), simple block patterns were used. During retrieval of 
the block pattern, participants were allowed to look freely 
around the scene but kept a central fixation. Therefore, 
Johansson et al. (2010) argue that looking-at-nothing 
behavior can relieve working memory load when task 
demands (e.g., a complex scene description) require it.  
Applying the findings of Johansson et al. (2010) to our 
results suggests that when memory load is high, looking at 
nothing is shown. When memory load is low – because all 
relevant information has been learned – looking-at-nothing 
behavior diminishes. Indeed, in block 1 of our study, when 
the presented material was new to participants, looking at 
nothing was shown. Later, when the material was strongly 
represented in memory, looking at nothing diminished. 
Decreased looking-at-nothing behavior might also be 
explained as the result of participants realizing over the 
course of the experiment that the visual area they refixate on 
no longer includes relevant information and therefore, this 
behavior becomes redundant. This implies that participants 
consciously control their gaze behavior. However, eye 
movements as described in the context of the looking-at-
nothing effect are a highly automatic and unconscious 
behavior (Rayner, 2009). Furthermore, if change in gaze 
behavior were due to conscious control (i.e., participants 
realize that during the retrieval phase, nothing is present 
anymore), we would then expect looking at nothing to 
diminish within the first block. Looking at data of the first 
four trials, we could not find such a tendency. Moreover, in 
the post-questionnaire participants did not report that they 
controlled their gaze behavior. 
We also realize that looking at nothing might not only 
diminish because participants have learned the material, but 
because they have given an automatic response to the 
stimuli that does not include fixations to the critical area. To 
rule out this alternative explanation one could present 
participants with the same sentences throughout the course 
of the experiment and sentences that change from trial to 
trial. If it is indeed the content of the integrated memory 
representation that is responsible for looking-at-nothing 
behavior, our results should be replicated in a way that 
looking-at-nothing behavior diminishes for stable sentences 
and does not diminish for new sentences. 
From the results of this study it can be concluded that 
information is represented internally, and that under certain 
conditions the external world is addressed in order to gather 
more information (Spivey, 2007). We have further shown 
that both ways of retrieving information are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive (Richardson et al., 2009). But, when is 
knowledge presented internally and when do we use an 
external memory store? We propose that working memory 
load may influence the decision to use either an internal or 
external memory store. However, a distinct boundary need 
not be imposed between these two modes of storage. Spivey 
(2007) proposes that knowledge representations can be 
described in a vague manner. That is, information can 
belong to both internal and external storages. Bocklisch, 
Bocklisch, Baumann, Scholz, and Krems (2010) highlighted 
a relationship between the concept of vagueness and 
knowledge representations. This link could inform future 
research that tests the usefulness of this approach for the 
investigation of mental representations. 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank Nina Bär for helpful comments on 
previous versions of this paper and Lars Eberspach for his 
help in conducting the experiment. 
References 
Anderson, J. R., & Schooler, L. (1991). Reflections of the 
environment in memory. Psychological Science, 2, 396–
408. 
Altmann, G.T. (2004). Language-mediated eye movements 
in the absence of a visual world: the ‘blank screen 
paradigm’. Cognition, 93, 79–87. 
Altmann, G.T., & Kamide, Y. (2007). The real-time 
mediation of visual attention by language and world 
knowledge: linking anticipatory (and other) eye 
movements to linguistic processing. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 57, 502–518. 
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new 
component of working memory? Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 4, 417−423. 
Bocklisch, F., Bocklisch, S.F., Baumann, M.R.K., Scholz, 
A., & Krems, J.F. (2010). The role of vagueness in the 
numerical translation of verbal probabilities: A fuzzy 
approach. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1974−1979). Austin, TX: 
Cognitive Science Society. 
Brandt, S.A., & Stark, L.W. (1997). Spontaneous eye 
movements using visual imagery reflect the content of the 
visual scene. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 
27−38. 
Ferreira, F., Apel, J., & Henderson, J.M. (2008). Taking a 
new look at looking at nothing. Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 12(11), 405−410. 
Hoffman, J. E., & Subramaniam, B. (1995). The role of 
visual attention in saccadic eye movements. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 57(6), 787−795. 
Hoover, M.A., & Richardson, D.C. (2008). When facts go 
down the rabbit hole: contrasting features and objecthood 
as indexes to memory. Cognition, 108, 533–542. 
Huettig, F., Olivers, C. N. L., & Hartsuiker, R. J. (2010). 
Looking, language, and memory: Bridging research from 
the visual world and visual search paradigms. Acta 
Psychologica. Advance online publication. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.07.013. 
Johansson, R., Holsanova, J., & Holmqvist, K. (2010). Eye 
movements during mental imagery are not reenactments 
of perception. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1968-1973). Austin, TX: 
Cognitive Science Society. 
Johansson, R., Holsanova, J., & Holmqvist, K. (2006). 
Pictures and spoken descriptions elicit similar eye 
movements during mental imagery, both in light and in 
complete darkness. Cognitive Science, 30, 1053–1079. 
Knoeferle, P., & Crocker, M. W. (2007). The influence of 
recent scene events on spoken comprehension: Evidence 
from eye movements. Journal of Memory and Language, 
57(4), 519−543. 
Laeng, B., & Teodorescu, D.S. (2002). Eye scanpaths 
during visual imagery re-enact those of perception of the 
same visual scene. Cognitive Science, 26, 207–231. 
O’Regan, J. K. (1992). Solving the ‘real’ mysteries of visual 
perception: The world as an outside memory. Canadian 
Journal of Psychology, 46, 461−488. 
Pylyshyn, Z. (2001). Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, 
and situated vision. Cognition, 80, 127−158. 
Rayner, K. (2009). The 35th Frederik Bartlett lecture: Eye 
movements and attention in reading, scene perception and 
visual search. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 62 (8), 1457–1506. 
Renkewitz, F. & Jahn, G. (2010). Tracking memory search 
for cue information. In A. Glöckner & C. Wittemann 
(Eds.), Foundations for tracing intuitions: Challenges, 
findings and categorizations. New York: Psychology 
Press. 
Richardson, D.C., Altmann, G.T.M., Spivey, M.J., & 
Hoover, M.A.  (2009). Much ado about eye movements to 
nothing: a response to Ferreira et al.: Taking a new look at 
looking at nothing. Trends in Cognitive Science, 13(6), 
235−236. 
Richardson, D.C., & Spivey, M.J. (2000). Representation, 
space and Hollywood Squares: looking at things that 
aren’t there anymore. Cognition, 76, 269–295. 
Shepherd, M., Findlay, J. M. & Hockey, R. J.(1986). The 
relationship between eye movements and spatial attention. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
Section A, 38(3), 475−491. 
Spivey, M. (2007). Uniting and Freeing the Mind. In: M. 
Spivey (Eds.), The continuity of mind. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Spivey, M.J, & Geng, J.J. (2001). Occulomotor mechanisms 
activated by imagery and memory: eye movements to 
absent objects. Psychological Research, 65, 235-241.  
